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ARTICLES
A CASE FOR PROPOSITION 209
GERARD V. BRADLEY*
The California bishops' statement and the longer testimo-
nies of Cardinal Mahony against Proposition 209 [hereinafter
"Prop 209"] show that their authors are not exercising their
teaching office, but speaking as church leaders to all persons of
good will. The bishops "ask" "all people of good will" to reject
Prop. 209 as "bad public policy"; affirmative action "can be", if
"judiciously administered," an "expression[ ]" of the "drive for
solidarity", and "one practical way" to work towardjustice. In his
1995 statement, Cardinal Mahony sets forth "principles that
should help shape the debate on affirmative action."' He recog-
nizes, however, that "people of good will may disagree with the
application of them", and aims to "assist[ ]" people to resolve the
issue in a "thoughtful and prayerful way. "2 In 1996 Cardinal
Mahony "announc[ed]" his "own opposition" to Prop 209 and
"urg[ed]" voters to "carefully consider the impact of this mea-
sure" before voting.3 Here, the bishops' statements are redolent
of the 1986 Economics Pastoral, which distinguished between the
moral principles which must govern debate and application of
them, a matter which could not be treated authoritatively and
which depended upon a range of debatable factual judgments,
including speculations about the likely future effects of particular
initiatives.4
The proposition that support of Prop 209 is wrong, immoral,
or in any other sense not a permissible option for Catholics is
nowhere asserted, nor is it implied, in the California episcopal
* Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.
1. Cardinal Roger Mahony, Affirmative Action and Catholic Social Teaching,
25 OlGiNs 89, 91 (1995).
2. Id.
3. Cardinal Roger Mahony, Solidarity and the Common Good: A Pastoral
Response to Proposition 209, 26 ORIGINs 229 (1996).
4. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLiC BISHOPS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR
ALL (1986), reprinted in CATHouc SocuAL THOUGHT: THE DocuMENTARY
HERITAGE at 572 (DavidJ. O'Brien & Thomas A. Shannon eds., 1992).
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statements. The authors steer entirely clear of language which
would suggest that their conclusion is to be accorded any more
weight than the force of their reasoning.
What of the "principles" identified by Cardinal Mahony in
his 1995 statement? Are they moral norms? A close look at Car-
dinal Mahony's 1995 paper shows that his three "principles" are
actually one assertion of fact - the effects of racism remain
"deeply woven into the fabric of society"5 - and two apparent
norms which are not so much "principles" by which affirmative
action might be critically evaluated as they are statements of sup-
port for affirmative action.6 If there is a principle it is this: Car-
dinal Mahony may be saying that, as a background norm to be
applied to the question of affirmative action, Californians have a
moral responsibility to make progress towards the eradication of
racial discrimination. Obviously, Prop 209 satisfies this
responsibility.
Cardinal Mahony's own distillation of the three "principles"
makes clear that, at most, he asserts two propositions, one
descriptive and one a moral norm:
Perhaps the clearest statement of the combined meaning
of the three principles is this:
First, it is essential to acknowledge that continued discrimi-
nation by race and gender sadly persists in our society.
Second, any attempts to reform 7 affirmative action must
retain the elimination of discrimination as their principal
goal."
I am entirely persuaded that this "combined meaning" of
Cardinal Mahony's three "principles" is sound, true, valid. I shall
argue nevertheless that conscientious and reasonable persons,
including faithful Catholics, not only can, but probably should,
support Prop 209. I shall argue, in other words, that there is a
5. Mahony, supra note 1, at 91.
6. These two apparent norms are: "Proposition 209 would eliminate, not
reform, affirmative action. In doing so, the initiative fails to institute any
alternative policies to foster progress towards the eradication of discrimination
and bias against women and minorities"; "Proposition 209 weakens society's
commitment - and, in particular, the commitment of government to be an
active player in the fights against discrimination suffered by women and
minorities." Id. at 92.
7. I take here "reform" to include the possibility included in Prop 209:
"reform" by abolition. Otherwise, the statement of "principles" by Cardinal
Mahony assumes that which it purports to argue for. I do not take Cardinal
Mahony to be simply asserting that, as a matter of moral principle no one may
support abo/ition of affirmative action; if that were his view, he would very likely
have said so clearly.
8. Mahony, supra note 1, at 92.
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very strong case to be made, consistent with the episcopal teach-
ings, for Prop 209.
My argument is about the central case of affirmative action,
and past legal and non-legal societal discrimination: African-
Americans. I assume that if my argument works for African-
Americans, it works as well or better for other ethnic groups and
for women as well.9 Perhaps my assumption is unsound. Even if
it is, my argument concerning Prop 209 as it pertains to African-
Americans stands on its own.
I
A. Is Prop 209 Racist?
"Racism" is in one sense the conviction that some racially-
defined group is inferior to another, often but not necessarily
the racial group of the person holding the conviction. The tragic
case of racism in American history is the conviction, once almost
universal among whites, that blacks lack either the intellectual
capacity or the capacity to control their passions, or both, of
whites.
Though considered thus very narrowly racism may be simply
a mistaken conviction, it cannot but obstruct community - soli-
darity - between the races and among individuals of different
races. Racism will therefore invariably issue in acts that are
unfair to members of the "inferior" group. These unfair acts
need not be interpersonal in the simple sense; an individual vot-
ing or otherwise supporting laws discriminating against a racial
group is guilty of unfairness, even if the individual has never met
a single member of that group or, if he has, bears no ill-feeling
towards those individuals and even considers them his friends.
And besides, racist convictions are commonly the product of
judgment distorted by unintegrated feelings (of repugnance,
hostility) towards the "inferior" group. So, though strictly a mat-
ter of mistake about what is, Cardinal Mahony rightly (for all
practical purposes) says, "[r]acism is a sin. . .that divides the
human family, blots out the image of God among specific mem-
bers of that family and violates the fundamental human dignity
9. The assimilation of racism to the whole structure of gender relations
and the differentiation of the sexes' roles common in affirmative action
programs, which generally treat race and gender as equally invidious bases for
discrimination in not only the United States but everywhere until just yesterday,
is entirely too easy. Critical discussion of this move is beyond the scope of this
paper.
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of those called to be children of the same Father." 0 The episco-
pal statements rightly emphasize, in addition, the present need
for special efforts to effect interracial "solidarity."
For a long time in American history public authority
enforced laws which obstructed, if they did not forbid altogether,
interracial solidarity. Regardless of the present extent of racist
convictions and even if no law survives which necessarily pro-
ceeds from racist convictions, the effects of centuries of racial
oppression remain. It is not extravagant to say that - indeed, I
think it is true to say - that the effects of past racism are still
"woven into the fabric of society."
Prop 209 does not necessarily proceed from racist convic-
tions. Despite the episcopal statements' emphasis upon the
theme of racial "solidarity," they nowhere say that support for
Prop 209 is racist. If their opposition to Prop 209 could be
deduced from racism itself, the bishops no doubt would have
said so. The bishops and Cardinal Mahony may believe - there
is some slight evidence in their statements that they do - that
support for Prop 209 correlates, in some noteworthy way, with
racist convictions. But they attempt no deduction and they offer
the correlation as no more than a passing observation.
What kind of law needs racist convictions for its justification
- or its rationalization? Logically, perhaps very few; even some
systems of slavery, though immoral, were supported not by racist
beliefs but by beliefs about the permissible treatment of captives.
There is no doubt, however, that the institution of American slav-
ery rested upon racist assumptions, as did Jim Crow.' The cou-
rageous bishops who spoke out against segregation rightly made
it a matter of faith and morals, even to the point of excluding
from communion segregationists who, after being clearly admon-
ished, scandalously persisted in their actions.
The California bishops say nothing like what those bishops
said about segregation. And it is clear that episcopal opposition
to Prop 209 proceeds not straightaway from racism to Prop 209,
but from beliefs about the instrumental value of affirmative
action to precisely what Prop 209 decrees: a discrimination-free
society.
There is no good reason to doubt that support for a law
which outlaws all forms of racial discrimination proceeds from
10. Mahony, supra note 1, at 92 (citing NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
CATHouc BISHOPS, BROTHERS AND SISTERS TO Us 4 (1979)).
11. Perhaps a few apologists for the institution of slavery in the Old South
defend slavery just as such (that is, they defend an institution that was not by
definition racist). But only blacks could be held as slaves in the Old South.
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the conviction either that all racial discrimination is wrong or, if
not, government affirmative action programs are, all things con-
sidered, detrimental to the common good. Indeed, the bishops
seem unaware of the significant extent to which affirmative
action contributes to, yet does not stem from, racism. In Glenn
Loury's words, "[m]easures billed as temporary have become per-
manent crutches for people who are implicitly assumed to be
incapable of competing." 2
B. Is Prop 209 Sound Just Because it Prohibits "Reverse
Discrimination"?
Many, maybe most, supporters of Prop 209 hold that affirm-
ative action is wrong simply because it involves "reverse" racial
discrimination, and that racial discrimination is simply wrong.
(Everyone seems to accept that remedies for specific acts of dis-
crimination -say, requiring an employer who has systematically
refused to hire blacks to prefer them henceforth, for a while - is
a different case.) There is at least one very important distinction
between the historical treatment of blacks in this country and
affirmative action of the last few decades: Jim Crow was, notwith-
standing Pessy v. Ferguson3 (where the Supreme Court said that
blacks imagined inferiority), entirely a product of the conviction
that blacks were inferior, unfit to mix with whites save in well-
defined (subordinate) roles. Affirmative action, even in the
extreme form of, say, hiring quotas, does not proceed from the
conviction that whites are inferior. This does not mean that quo-
tas are appropriate. But they are not racist, in the ordinary sense
of that term, and they are not symmetrical with the tradition of
American racism, as the term "reverse discrimination" suggests.
Simply put, affirmative action is not wrong just because
desegregation is right. Affirmative action, assuming it involves
racial discrimination, is not wrong just for that reason, unless
there is a moral norm like: "one may never consider race."
There is no such true norm. Racial discrimination, in the simple
sense of legal classification by race, is almost always wrong. That it
is almost always wrong is conceded by Prop 209's opponents, not
least by the bishops. The bishops defend "affirmative action" on
grounds which distinguish it from "quotas" and "reverse discrimi-
nation." Were racial discrimination not almost always wrong,
how could the effects of past discrimination be so central a "prin-
ciple?" How could the goal of ending all discrimination be
offered, as it is by the bishops, as self-evidently worthwhile?
12. Glenn Loury, Absolute Califomia, NEW REPUBLiC, Nov. 18, 1996, at 17.
13. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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Some racial classifications make good sense. Obviously, cast-
ing the local public high school's production of Guess Who's Com-
ing to Dinner cannot be color-blind. Whenever a particular
condition tracks a racial group, and where the condition is within
the part of the common good committed to the care of govern-
ment, laws which discriminate on racial grounds may be appro-
priate. Testing for sickle-cell anemia may be limited to races
susceptible to the disease. For a certain period of time after the
end of legally-imposed racially discriminatory disabilities, affirma-
tive action isjustifiable. Certainly it was for a long time after slav-
ery was abolished, at least in the South: being African-American
was then practically identical with being handicapped by past dis-
crimination - slavery. Right now, it seems to me, job recruiting
programs among certain segments of the African-American com-
munity - I am thinking of inner-city neighborhoods - can be
justified as responding just to its residents' reasonable (if not cor-
rect) perception that they are not welcome in, say, the local fire
or police departments. If Prop 209 outlaws this type of recruiting
- and I doubt that it need be interpreted to do so - then that is
an argument against Prop 209.
Racial discrimination is generally wrong because it is almost
always unfair. Why is it unfair? Because race (and skin color,
genetic identity) is not a character trait. Race does not affect
basic human dignity; what counts as human flourishing for one
race is what counts as human flourishing for all other races. In
sum, race just as such is almost never a reason upon which anyone
ought to act.
Since no moral norm absolutely excludes considering race,
how do we evaluate cases where an exception is urged? The
morality of racial discrimination is a matter of fairness, a matter
of applying the Golden Rule. One way of carrying out the
thought experiment of applying the Golden Rule is to ask: if I (a
black job candidate, or a white job candidate) were in the other's
shoes, would I agree that considering race is all right? Would the
black beneficiary of affirmative action agree that race "counts," if
the beneficiary did not know his race going into the debate?
Would a white candidate insist that public benefits be distributed
in a "color-blind" way if he were unaware of his own race? This is
something close to the Rawlsian "original position" - itself a
thought experiment - in which each is ignorant of how his or
her interests will be affected by the rule he or she assents to. This
is precisely the point of the Golden Rule: to eliminate the arbi-
trariness that self-preference ordinarily produces. Note well:
here is the terminal point of "solidarity" as a reason: eliminating
ties of affection and the tug of self-interest as well as emotional
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aversion to other races and their legitimate differences in style,
culture, habits, and so on simply is solidarity. Put differently,
conscientiously applying the Golden Rule is "solidarity."
Someone will object that this abstraction prescinds from the
reality which gives rise to the problem: blacks, and not whites,
were victims for centuries of racial oppression. Blacks still suffer
the effects of it. Conceded. I maintain that the question raised
by Prop 209 is a question of fairness, and no one seems to doubt
- certainly not the bishops, not me, and probably not my objec-
tor - that racial discrimination is generally wrong. But let us
put this objection even more strongly, in a way which resonates
with portions of the episcopal statements: still suffering the
effects of centuries of oppression, African-Americans are now vic-
tims, in an important sense, of a continuing injustice. They cer-
tainly consider affirmative action to be in their interest. They
view white attitudes towards affirmative action (correctly or
incorrectly) as transparent for whites' conviction about the leg-
acy of white oppression and about whites' responsibility for it.
One might say, in this construal, that affirmative action is the
opposite of the Confederate battle flag; affirmative action is,
understandably enough, counted by many African-Americans as
a litmus test of white society's bona fides.
This is surely an argument for an exemption to a general
rule prohibiting race discrimination. But the criterion for evalu-
ating it - granting, not conceding, the accuracy of the claims -
is still the Golden Rule.
Applying the Golden Rule is a matter of taking stock care-
fully of what one's own values, goals, and interests are. How does
one wish to be treated? The results of applying the Golden Rule
will vary from person to person applying it. For the Golden Rule
does not produce a single right answer, at least not often it does.
Given the track record of affirmative action, its continuing
across-the-board preference for all members of a racial group
regardless of individual histories, no matter what his or her indi-
vidual history, speculation about a better future may seem to peo-
ple who have a will toward the common good, unfair. This, it
seems to me, is precisely why the California bishops and Cardinal
Mahony depict their own statements as nonbinding recommen-
dations. Their conclusions - self-styled personal opposition -
constitute their personal answers to a matter of individual
discernment.
To continue my response to the objector who says, in effect,
affirmative action must be evaluated by the Golden Rule con-
cretely, in this society, with its history, now: I agree. But let us
add all the relevant facts - the history of past discrimination, the
1997]
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effect upon the life plans of non-minority applicants, the various
costs associated with public expenditures for "qualified" minority
contractors who are not the low bidders, Glenn Loury's concern
that affirmative action fosters the conviction that blacks are infer-
ior, the apparent indifference of some inner-city residents to the
pursuit of opportunities that are available to them - and much
more - to the scales. It is all the more clear then that conscien-
tious people can legitimately disagree on whether affirmative
action does more harm than good; that affirmative action is, all
things considered, unfair.
My own view is that we have reached the point in our society,
partly due to past affirmative action, where the distribution of
disadvantages traceable to legally enforced racism is unevenly dis-
tributed across the black population. Disadvantage due to struc-
tural injustice in our society has split off from race, and includes
now many people of all races. If they stood in the shoes of a
working-class young white man who, through sheer determina-
tion, excelled in school and who is convinced that his vocation is
to be a college teacher of religion, I doubt that many people
would consider it fair if, due to affirmative action, securing such
employment was out of the question for him.
C. Is Prop 209 Wrong for Other Reasons?
1. Discrimination against any person with respect to basic
human rights is always wrong. It is wrong to intentionally kill the
innocent and, when a group of innocents is targeted due to their
common racial or ethnic identity, it is genocide. Genocide is
always wrong. Discrimination, including racial discrimination, in
the provision of essentials like food, medicine, and clothing is
invariably wrong. Prop 209 does not involve basic human rights
or the necessities of life. Nowhere do the episcopal statements
suggest otherwise. Prop 209 does not deny anyone any goods. It
stipulates that the criteria for access to some of them shall not
include race. So, the relevant principle is the falsity of racism,
which we have discussed.
2. Cardinal Mahony rightly challenges us to "transcend this
culture of individualism in order to be able to measure the impli-
cations of our policy decisions in terms that reach beyond the
boundaries of narrow self-interest." 4 Again, it is entirely unclear
whether the jobs, contracts, and admissions at stake on the Prop
209 debate exercise their tempting influence more upon sup-
porters or opponents of that measure. Certainly, there is no nec-
essary relationship involved.
14. Mahony, supra note 3, at 231.
A CASE FOR PROPOSITION 209
3. The bishops state clearly enough that they aim for an
end to racial discrimination, that affirmative action is a worth-
while means. Affirmative action is "one practical way" to "over-
come" past and present discrimination; 1 5 it is an "interim
measure[ ] needed to ensure that certain social ills are con-
tained";16 "wholesale elimination" of affirmative action would be
a "major setback to our nation's tenuous commitment to creat-
ing a discrimination-free society." 17
These comments suggest an eventual color-blind society.
But these comments also sit uneasily alongside signals that a mul-
tiracial society in which "diversity" is prized for its own sake is the
bishops' desideratum. Are we invited to approve affirmative
action just for its own sake, as what it means to have and maintain
a significant, if not proportional, representation of, say, African-
American sectors in all sectors and at all levels of society?
4. Perhaps the bishops' primary point is that Prop 209 is a
wholesale response to a retail problem, that "reform," not aboli-
tion, is the proper response to what they may implicitly be con-
ceding has been a crude or an excessive affirmative action.
"Excessive" affirmative action might include informal but real
quotas, other forms of racial discrimination that block access to
opportunity for disadvantaged whites, like our working class reli-
gion student.
But in whom would the reformers place authority to imple-
ment needed reforms? What kind of people, with what biases,
loyalties, political debts, and according to what enforceable crite-
ria, would do this job? What are the reasons - based in experi-
ence and logic - to believe that a properly reformed affirmative
action could be strictly limited to the types of programs the bish-
ops approve, the types of recruitment efforts that, for example,
Glenn Loury mentions - outreach to young African-Americans
who reasonably but incorrectly believe certain opportunities are
not available to them? Upon what reasonable basis could - do
- the bishops suppose that race-based "affirmative action"
should be retained even if "merit-based or class/income based"
programs are available? These questions may reduce to one: is it
prudent to continue to accord government the authority to dis-
criminate on the basis of race? Despite some benefits forgone, is
it more prudent to take away that authority?
15. Statement Opposing California's Proposition 209 by the California
Catholic Conference of Bishops 2 (Oct. 25, 1996) [hereinafter Statement] (on
file with author).
16. Mahony, supra note 3, at 231.
17. Id.
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Maybe the bishops think that solidarity suggests, even
requires, that compensation to victims of past discrimination
continue, not least because those victims consider it their due.
But, if genuine disadvantage no longer closely tracks race and if
for many blacks the effects of past racism have all but disap-
peared (again, partly due to affirmative action) then the indis-
criminate use of "victims" is question-begging.
II
The bishops present affirmative action as basically a matter
of equal opportunity, and they say that equal opportunity is what
the common good is all about. So, affirmative action as the bish-
ops describe it fits the end of public authority - the common good
- as they describe it pretty tightly.
Is affirmative action as the bishops describe it? Is the com-
mon good as they describe it?
The answer to each question is "No."
The bishops criticize "quotas," and insist that affirmative
action involves only, or at least principally, opening up the doors
of equal opportunity slammed shut by racism to qualified minor-
ity applicants."8 The bishops explicitly call upon "legislative and
judicial remedies" to "exclude bias or reverse discrimination" in
affirmative action.19
On this account, affirmative action "open[s] opportunities
in the work place, in educational institutions, and in public con-
tracting to qualified women and minority candidates";' ° affirma-
tive action "has sought to remove some of the institutional
obstacles which have hindered opportunities", a matter of "equal
access to opportunity";2 1 "affirmative action is about creating
access to education and employment";' "these programs . . .
have played an instrumental role in opening opportunities previ-
ously unavailable ... "I
In his extraordinarily sensitive and persuasive analysis of
Prop 209, Glenn Loury mentions some examples of the kind of
"affirmative action" the bishops likely have in mind: "aggressive
recruitment" of black candidates to a manifestly racially
imbalanced police force.2 4 There are certainly some police
18. Statement, supra note 15, at 1-2.
19. Id. at 1.
20. Mahony, supra note 3, at 229.
21. Id. at 231.
22. Id. at 232.
23. Id. at 231.
24. Loury, supra note 12, at 19.
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departments that young black men view, with good reason, as
little different than a giant KKK convention. The bishops men-
tion recruitment, as well as job-training programs, flexible hiring
goals, and timetables for promotion. All this makes for a worth-
while project
The bishops seem to think, that is, that affirmative action
does not necessarily involve racial discrimination. If affirmative
action did not involve racial discrimination, the bishops would
perhaps have an unanswerable case for affirmative action. But
"quotas" are not the problem; rarely does "affirmative action"
take the form of, say, "fifty black freshmen no matter what."
"Qualified" they shall be, but anyone with experience in these
matters knows that "qualified" is often determined by the creden-
tials of minority candidates. And "qualified" is not to say "com-
petitive," or "best qualified".
Public jobs, public contracts and university admissions are
highly competitive. Any "plus" for minority status is a benefit
conferred solely due to race. Being a competitive situation, this
"plus" negatively affects non-minority candidates' chances solely
due to their race. This is racial discrimination. Call it "benign" if
you like, or argue for it. But it is still racial discrimination, and
no matter what you call it, the Golden Rule is the relevant moral
norm.
Now, if the bishops' statements are interpreted as favoring
only that affirmative action which avoids racial discrimination
they would (as I said) have a strong case - for Prop 209, at least
on the view that one cannot prefer people on the basis of race in
competitive situations without disfavoring some other people on
the bases of race.
In my view, affirmative action is not as the bishops depict it.
Is the common good as the bishops depict it)
Cardinal Mahony states that the "whole raison d'etre" for
the state is "the realization of the common good in the temporal
order."2 5 "The Catholic tradition envisions the common good as
those social conditions which enable persons to maximize their gifts
and talents through equal access to opportunity."26 So, the bishops
present an unanswerable argument affirmative action is equal
25. See Mahony, supra note 1, at 92 (citing JoHN XXHI, MATER Er
MAGmSTEA para. 20 (1961), reprinted in CATHOtc SoctA.L THouGrr, supra note 4,
at 87.
26. See Mahony, supra note 3, at 231 (emphasis added). My argument in
the text supposes that, in Cardinal Mahony's formulation, "through equal
access to opportunity" restricts "maximize their gifts and talents."
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access to opportunity and the common good - the justifying
aim of the state - just is equal access to opportunity.
Here is the "Catholic tradition," as stated in Dignitatis
Humanae (and, I should add, stated indistinguishably in Gaudium
et Spes?7) concerning the "common good":
Since the common welfare of society consists in the
entirety of those conditions of social life under which men
enjoy the possibility of achieving their own perfection in a
certain fulness of measure and also with some relative ease,
it chiefly consists in the protection of the rights, and in the
performance of the duties, of the human person.28
The phrase "equal access to opportunity"' does not appear
in the relevant passages of the Council documents, nor does it in
the new universal Catechism. It seems to be a homemade term,
being given a prominence by the bishops that, even if all
equivalent expressions of the same concepts are considered, it
simply does not have in the Catholic tradition.
The bishops' account of the common good and their naive
view of affirmative action do not, by themselves, inexorably lead
one to opposition to Prop 209. For the bishops do not seem to
take into account that the common good is not coterminous with
the scope of public authority: they seem to move without addi-
tional premises frmn the cultural roots of the effects of racism to a
state remedy. But even ifJim Crow is partly responsible for pres-
ent racial disparities in the distribution of goods and resources, it
does not follow that state affirmative action is justified. If the
effects of Jim Crow are "deeply woven into the fabric of soci-
ety,"5 0 it does not follow that the state is obliged to try to extir-
pate them by state law, much less by state hiring, contracting, and
school admission policies. To what extent the common good is
to be committed to government is not itself deducible from the
idea or definition of the common good.
Prop 209 leaves civil society free to pursue affirmative action,
and it is consistent with the bishops' notion of the common good
to conclude that the state maintains proper "social conditions" 3
1
by protecting private liberty to engage in affirmative action, or
not. One could, in addition, reason that given the history of
27. Second Vatican Council, GAUDIUM ET SPES (1965), 7pyinted in
CATHoLIC SoczAL. THOUGHT, supra note 4, at 166.
28. DIGNIrATIS HuMANAE, para. 6. The Catechism, para. 1906, adopts the
equivalent formulation of GAUDIUM ET SPES, supra note 26.
29. See Mahony, supra note 3, at 231.
30. See Mahony, supra note 1, at 91.
31. See Mahony, supra note 3, at 231.
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abuse, the types of people (bureaucrats, college faculty, politi-
cians) who administer public affirmative action, the misinforma-
tion campaigns that distort their active operation where silence
does not obscure it, and the mixed results of thirty years of
affirmative action that the power to discriminate on the basis of
race, albeit for assertedly "remedial" purposes, is one that it is no
longer safe to give to government. When the immediate benefi-
ciaries of affirmative action are, moreover, middle- and upper-
class minorities whose access to equal opportunity has not been
abridged-at least not demonstrably, compared to the unfavora-
ble opportunities of other identifiable population groups-rea-
sonable people could conclude that affirmative action for
impoverished individuals, or for persons who can demonstrate a
genuine lack of opportunity due to social conditions, is prefera-
ble to race-based affirmative action. Where such categories are
not transparent for race, even if they are predominantly popu-
lated by minorities, Prop 209 presents no barrier.
III
Federal District Judge Thelton Henderson temporarily
restrained enforcement of Prop 209 on November 27, 1996.32
He entered a permanent injunction on December 23, 1996, find-
ing that the plaintiff was likely to succeed on two grounds at a
trial seeking to invalidate Prop 209: Prop 209 is pre-empted by
Title VII, and it violates the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee
of "full participation in the political life of the community."13 I
leave aside the statutory basis for Judge Henderson's order. I
shall argue that the constitutional holding is unsound and briefly
describe how its unsoundness stems from a central flaw in con-
temporary constitutional jurisprudence.'M
Judge Henderson said that he could not "overemphasize[ ]"
that the court did not adjudicate "whether affirmative action is
right or wrong, or whether it is no longer an appropriate policy
for addressing the continuing effects of past and present discrim-
-31
ination against racial minorities and women. Judge Hender-
32. Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480 (N.D.
Cal.).
33. Id. at 1489 (citing Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, 458
U.S. 457, 467 (1982)).
34. In an opinion filed April 8, 1997, a panel of the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case to the
District Court. This ruling will undoubtedly be subject to an appeal to the
United States Supreme Court, where the arguments of Judge Henderson,
criticized in the text above, will undoubtedly be pressed.
35. Id. at 1490.
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son did not, in other words, engage Prop 209 as policy, as the
California bishops did.
Judge Henderson's opinion pivoted upon the constitutional
permissibility of a relatively narrow band of affirmative action,
that affirmative action which could pass muster under the
Supreme Court's demanding precedents for state-sponsored pro-
grams. Note well: nowhere did Judge Henderson say that these
possibilities were mandatory, and they clearly are not. Repeat:
no state is required by the Constitution to engage in the affirma-
tive action prohibited by Prop 209.
The stated constitutional basis for his injunction was entirely
what Judge Henderson called "the Seattle-Hunter doctrine.""6 In
Hunter v. Eicksons7 the Supreme Court invalidated, as violative
of the Equal Protection Clause, an Akron city charter amend-
ment which subjected any fair housing ordinance to popular
approval before it could become effective. The affected ordi-
nances were defined as those regulating real estate transactions
on the basis of "race, color, religion, national origin, or ances-
try." " Other ordinances, including ordinances regulating real
estate transactions on other bases, became effective thirty days
after the City Council passed them, subject to a referendum if
ten percent of the voters requested it via a timely petition. 9
The United States Supreme Court concluded that, although
facially neutral, "the reality is that the law's impact falls on the
minority. " ' This "special burden[ ] on racial minorities within
the governmental process" was invalid, because "the State may
no more disadvantage any particular group by making it more diffi-
cult to enact legislation in its behalf than it may dilute any per-
son's vote or give any group a smaller representation than
another of comparable size."41 Just so far stated, Hunter would
invalidate the Prohibition amendment to the Constitution, if not
almost any constitutional provision. For one effect of constitu-
tionalizing a norm affecting people's primary conduct is to make
it impossible for an affected group to secure its interests through
normal political processes. It may well be that the Hunter court
meant to limit its statement to particular minority groups. But
such a limitation would be inconsistent with the justifying princi-
ple cited: no person's vote may be deemed by a legislative major-
36. Id. at 1499.
37. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
38. Id. at 390.
39. Id. at 391, 393.
40. Id. at 391.
41. Id. at 393 (emphasis added).
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ity to count as, say, one-half of someone else's. It is one person,
one vote, period.
If Hunter was rightly decided, its rule must be understood as
interested not in the effect of laws but in the motives or aims or
reasons of the people who brought it into being. The Hunter
court must be understood as treating the Akron ordinance as
transparent for a racially motivated attack upon the legitimate
legislative objectives of African-Americans.
Washington v. Seattle School District No. 142 relied upon
Huntefs dilution passage to strike down a state initiative which, in
relevant part, forbade mandatory busing of public school pupils
for purposes of racial integration. The occasion for this exercise
of the popular, state-wide lawmaking provided by the Washing-
ton Constitution was an extensive program of mandatory busing
in Seattle, designed to alleviate racial "isolation" due to segre-
gated housing patterns.4"
A bare majority of the Court in Seattle said that busing for
desegregation, "like the Akron open housing ordinance" "inures
primarily to the benefit of the minority"." "As in Hunter," the
majority continued, "the community's political mechanisms are
modified to place effective decision-making authority over a
racial issue at a different level of government."' The majority
construed a state law absolutely forbidding mandatory busing for
racial purposes as effectively vote diluting, citing Hunter. "the real-
location of decisionmaking authority worked by Initiative 356r;1
"the comparative structural burden placed on the political
achievement of minority interests";47 "the selective allocation of
decisionmaking authority worked by Initiative 350.. . .";" "Initia-
tive 350 worked a major reordering of the State's educational
decisionmaking process."' In fact, and notwithstanding the
Supreme Court majority's suggestions to the contrary, Initiative
350 was not even challenged as an unauthorized use of the Initia-
tive power under the state constitution. That is, nothing in the
Washington state constitution excluded, expressly or impliedly,
busing or school matters generally from resolution by Initiative.
Nor did the Supreme Court suggest that, in the Seattle circum-
stance, busing was mandatory.
42. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
43. Id. at 460.
44. Id. at 472.
45. Id. at 474.
46. Id. at 474, n.17 (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 475, n.17.
48. Id. (emphasis added).
49. Id. at 479.
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The state defendants as well as the dissenting Justices chal-
lenged the Seattle majority's reliance upon Hunter, arguing that
the Initiative "worked a simple change in policy rather than a
forbidden reallocation of power."50 This argument invited the
Court into the enactors' perspective, to view Initiative 350 as a
determination that mandatory busing for racial balancing was
detrimental to the common good. On this internal view the
lawmakers said: busing is bad public policy; it is not permitted.
Of course, being a positive law, Initiative 350 could be repealed
by the same means it was created. But nothing in the Initiative
suggested that its promoters held the Hunteish view that busing
was a good thing, but that it was the type of thing that ought to
be treated, as a procedural matter, different from other issues,
including other racial issues.
The Seattle Court stuck to its external or third person view,
refusing this invitation to adopt the internal perspective. "As in
Hunter, then, the community's political mechanisms are modi-
fied to place effective decisionmaking authority over a racial
issue at a different level of government" 5" "As the Court noted
in Hunter... 'the State may no more disadvantage any particular
group by making it more difficult to enact legislation in its behalf
than it may dilute any person's vote.'" 52
Now, there is an appealing simplicity to the Seattle-Hunter
doctrine: if it violates the Constitution to count, say, a black's
vote as one-half a vote, then it violates the Constitution to make it
twice as difficult for blacks and their supporters to enact blacks'
(asserted) interests into law. The Seattle court concluded that
requiring desegregation laws, and only such laws, to be passed by
unanimous vote of the legislature would be constitutionally sus-
pect.5" Indeed it would, on the assumption - which I have
argued is essential to make sense of Hunter - that such laws are
transparently for a racially discriminatory purpose.
Judge Henderson said that the racial preferences that Prop
209 prohibited were constitutionally suspect after Croson.54 He
nowhere questioned the freedom of Californians as an initial
matter to decide the matter, including a decision against affirma-
tive action, and to do so at the state level. But prior to passage of
Prop 209, Judge Henderson stated, minorities and women seek-
ing preference in public contracts, employment and education
50. Id. at 476.
51. Id. at 474.
52. Id. at 476 (quoting Hunter, 393 U.S. at 393).
53. Id. at 486-87.
54. City of Richmond v. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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could secure those preferences the way other preference-seekers
- the disabled and veterans - still can: by petitioning, lobbying,
and otherwise influencing the relevant policymaker, administra-
tor, bureaucrat. After Prop 209, women and minorities "face a
considerably more daunting burden": they must amend the Cali-
fornia Constitution to repeal Prop 209 or to permit the particular
preference they seek.55
Judge Henderson adopted what I am calling the third-per-
son observer view of Prop 209: the effec of Prop 209 was to
restructure the political process to make it more difficult for cer-
tain groups to enact their interests into law. That is true. In
Judge Henderson's view, this was Prop 209. Quoting Seattle quot-
ing Hunter, "the State may no more disadvantage any particular
group by making it more difficult to enact legislation in its behalf
than it may dilute any person's vote."56 But what justifies this
point of view, the view which treats effects, or at least some of
them, as what the law is?
Could it be clearer that Prop 209 meant to prohibit a certain
class of government action, insofar as possible to do so by positive
law? And that they were not trying to restructure the political
process? The internal point of view means just that: looking
through a law for its reasons, understanding a law by uncovering
its aim, its purpose, its reasons.
Consider how much is lost by flipping into the third person
view. Is it fair to say that the promoters of the First Amendment
meant to make it more difficult for religious groups to get gov-
ernment money, rather than to prohibit that practice insofar as
they could do so? Did the people who voted Prohibition into the
Constitution mean to place bootleggers and drinkers at a "com-
parative disadvantage" in the political process? Even though it
was obvious that Prohibition could be - and eventually was -
repealed according to the same rules by which it was instituted?
One wonders, from Judge Henderson's point of view, whether
the Thirteenth Amendment serves the common good, or
whether it just happens to be a hard-won stipulation in favor of
minority interests?
It is worth considering at this juncture whether Judge Hen-
derson could have justified his injunction from the internal point
of view. He could not, save on the assumption, which he
expressly denied, that "permissible" affirmative action was really
mandatory. But the assumption is entirely unsound. So, it
seems, the only basis upon which an injunction might be predi-
55. Coalition for Economic Equity, 946 F. Supp. at 1498.
56. Id. at 1499.
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cated is the Seattle misinterpretation of Hunter, the third person
view.
IV
The people of the State of California decided in November
1996 that no discrimination - malign or benign, if you like -
was permissible. They said that it shall not be done, and their
saying so under those circumstances made it the fundamental
positive law of their state. Judge Henderson simply could not -
at least he did not - see this possibility. He treated the uncondi-
tional decision by the people that certain acts are contrary to the
common good as an attempt to handicap a particular group's
chances of enacting its legislative agenda.
What is the source of this opacity of authoritative pro-
nouncements for the common good? Why is not legislation to be
treated as transparent for reasoned determinations about how to
structure our common life?
There is a certain proper opacity in judicial reasoning. One
would expect a court to treat Prop 209 as binding upon its (the
court's) deliberations because it was enacted. After all, in October
1996 no court was bound to treat all affirmative action by the
California state government as illegal. Once enacted, however,
courts would have (but for the injunction) treated Prop 209 as
binding upon them, and so would have invalidated all affirmative
action. In one important sense, Prop 209 is authoritative just
because a majority of voters voted for it. Their aggregated pref-
erences, in an important sense, made it law.
But that does not mean that their aim, intent, motive was to
impose their preferences. Such a view is absurd: no one adopts
a view (or votes a certain way) because it is his view or preference.
One adopts a view (or votes a certain way) because one accords a
certain validity (soundness, truth) to the reasons for the view.
Indeed, laws must be treated as transparent for their reasons if
we are to make sense of them at all. Nothing in the preceding
paragraph implies or entails, however, the prepolitical legitimacy
of everything someone might want to do, much less does any-
thing there imply or entail that majority approval be treated as
preponderant aggregated preferences, as if there were no com-
mon good - a good that transcends all interests - available for
choice.
Judge Henderson's flip into the third person is a recurring
problem in contemporary constitutional law. Consider this
example of the opacity of legislation for the reasons of those
responsible for enacting it. The writer is Robert Bork:
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The central problem for constitutional courts is the resolu-
tion of the "Madisonian dilemma." The United States was
founded as a Madisonian system, which means that it con-
tains two opposing principles that must be continually rec-
onciled. The first principle is self-government, which
means that in wide areas of life majorities are entitled to
rule, if they wish, simply because they are majorities. The
second is that there are nonetheless some things majorities
must not do to minorities, some areas of life in which the
individual must be free of majority rule. The dilemma is
that neither majorities nor minorities can be trusted to
define the proper spheres of democratic authority and
individual liberty. To place that power in one or the other
would risk either tyranny by the majority or tyranny by the
minority.
a7
The Hawaii trial court which in late 1996 held that state's
marriage laws unconstitutional turned to a "useful and informa-
tive" analysis of a District Court judge in a similar case. It, too, is
a pretty good example of the opacity of law for its reasons:
[I]f the government cannot cite actual prejudice to the
public majority from a change in the law to allow same-sex
marriages.. .then the public majority will not have a sound
basis for claiming a compelling, or even a substantial, state
interest in withholding the marriage statute from same-sex
couples; a mere feeling of distaste or even revulsion at what
someone else is or does, simply because it offends majority
values without causing concrete harm, cannot justify inher-
ently discriminatory legislation against members of a con-
stitutionally protected class-as the history of
constitutional rulings against racially discriminatory legisla-
tion makes clear.
Suppose, on the other hand, that scientifically credible
deterrence evidence were forthcoming at trial, so that
either the heterosexual majority or the homosexual minor-
ity would be prejudiced in some concrete way, depending
on whether the marriage statute was, or was not, available
to homosexual couples. In that case, the ultimate question
of whose values should be enforced, framed in terms of
what a substantial or compelling state interest really is,
57. ROBERT Bom, TmE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 139-40 (1990).
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would pose the hardest possible question for the court as
majority and minority interests resoundingly clash.58
Perhaps the absurd reach of this opacity is the Supreme
Court opinion in the Colorado Amendment 2 case, Evans v.
Romer.59 There the court treated a law which (rightly or wrongly,
though in my view the former) obviously proceeded from the
conviction that the common good was not served by laws which
extended benefits to people identified just as homosexual or
bisexual as activated by an "animus," a desire simply to "harm" a
certain group.
CONCLUSION
Whence the derailment of a proper reliance upon authority
onto the track sketched by Robert Bork? To some extent the
derailment owes to an honest misreading of our tradition.
Madison certainly worried about factions - majority and minor-
ity - precisely because there was a genuine common good tran-
scending interests which factions endangered. To some extent,
the relativism in our constitutional law tracks relativism in our
popular culture and, of course, it is characteristic of liberal polit-
ical theory to exclude the truth about the good from public
space. I wish to add, as a concluding note, another explanation,
the secularism which entered our constitutional law in 1947.
Let me explain.
"At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own con-
cept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery
of human life." With this pronouncement, the Supreme Court in
Planned Parenthood v. Case" endorsed a radical subjectivism,
which is relativism individualized: everyone gets to make up his
own moral universe. And, as the Court made clear in Casey, pub-
lic authority's task is precisely to protect individuals in their
autonomous acts of creation. The political common good, in
other words, consists not in helping people to choose to lead
genuinely (truly, really) worthwhile lives, but to protect their
opportunity to live whatever life, however elevated or degraded,
they happen to choose.
This subjectivism explains, and in the eyes of some, justifies,
the most arresting episodes in constitutional law of the last gen-
58. Baehr v. Mike, Civ. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *21 (Haw. Cir.
Ct. 1996) (quoting Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 355-56 (D.C.
1995)).
59. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
60. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 851 (1992).
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eration or so - pornography, abortion, the emerging rights to
assisted suicide and to "gay marriage." Given the importance of
constitutional decisions in our society, these episodes have much
to do with defining individual rights, individual responsibility
and the common good.
Where does this subjectivism come from? From the courts,
yes, and from contemporary elite culture, probably. The Justices
have also claimed deep historical roots. But at least as to claims
about the period prior to World War II, these claims are false.
One important reason why this subjectivism cannot reach too far
back is because, it seems to me, it is possible only where seculaism
has already taken hold. Why is secularism so related to subjectiv-
ism? All too briefly, divine revelation received by Jews, Chris-
tians, and Muslims showed them the unreality of sources of
meaning besides God and human persons posited by other world
views - spirits, demi-gods, etc. Apart from God the creator,
there was only created world, and in that world, only God and
persons could give meaning and value. Secularism accepts the
destruction of false gods, but denies God the creator as well. Sec-
ularism leaves nothing but human thoughts and desires as
sources of the meaning and value.
Now, in a secularized regime we should expect that the ques-
tion of who or what counts as a subject to whom moral duties,
like the duty not to kill, are owed is resolved according to the
interests of those who already count as persons. In our polity, we
see that the (alleged) instrumental necessity of abortion to
women's lifestyles is the major premise of the argument for
abortion.
In a secularized society, a genuine common good that tran-
scends people's de facto interests and desires is, strictly, incon-
ceivable. In place of a common good, including inalienable
human rights, we should expect a discourse about ordering our
life together that is, in reality if not confessedly, a more or less
stable consensus of persons able to articulate their interests on
an agenda. What this leads to in constitutional matters involving
family law, for example, is this: groups defending heterosexual
marriage as, simply, the truth about marriage are viewed by
courts as just another group pushing its agenda in the public
square. And this is what we see in the judicial opinions.
So, at least provisionally, we are warranted in thinking that
the root, or at least an essential precondition, of the subjectivism
that inhabits our constitutional law is secularism. Where did this
secularism come from? Since Americans are today overwhelm-
ingly a believing people (the percentage of Americans identify-
ing themselves as Christians is on the order of 85%), it has not
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come primarily from popular desires or, for that matter, from
legislators. It is a commonplace observation about American his-
tory that religion has played a critical role in maintaining our
political system. The Founders, Madison said in Federalist Ten
that republican institutions presuppose a virtuous citizenry. How
would the citizens maintain their virtue? The answer was pretty
simple: religion, and religiously-grounded morality.
This belief was virtually unchallenged until the twentieth
century. Even after Protestant cultural hegemony in public life
waned, as late as 1952 in Zorach v. Clamon 1 the Supreme Court
said that "[w]e are a religious people whose institutions presup-
pose a Supreme Being." In 1963 the Court said that the "Found-
ing Fathers believed devotedly that there was a God and the
unalienable rights of man were rooted in Him is clearly evi-
denced in their writings, from the Mayflower Compact to the
Constitution itself."612
So, where did the secularism that we are, provisionally,
assuming is a precondition of subjectivism come from? The lode-
star of constitutional law pertaining to religion and the exercise
of public authority is the First Amendment's Establishment
Clause. What was the general understanding of the principle of
nonestablishment before the beginning of the modem jurispru-
dential era in the Everson63 case of 1947?
Nonestablishment meant for a very, very long time in Ameri-
can history no preference for one religion over another. The
Founders' insight, at the end of the eighteenth century, was this:
the common good of their society did not depend upon the
truth of the matters that distinguished the Protestant sects. What
distinguished Methodists from Presbyterians - finer points of
doctrine, modes of worship, church disciplinary practices and
governing structure - could be safely declared beyond the com-
petence of public authority. The law knew no heresy, no dogma,
and established no sect. And a glance at the historical record
from the Founders up to Everson reveals public support, promo-
tion, encouragement of religion.
This was rendered by the Supreme Court in Everson as, no
support of religion at all, even if there is not a trace of bias for or
against any particular religion. The Everson court said that the
government must protect the religious liberty equally of believers
and nonbelievers alike. The Justices have said that no govern-
61. 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
62. School District of Abington Township v. Curlett, 374 U.S. 203, 213
(1963).
63. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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mental entity has care of the common good, if any there be, in
religion. Religion is a private matter and therefore not a legiti-
mate perspective on public matters. In other words, the public
realm is a secular realm. To put it all simply, and in sum: in a
secular public realm there is going to be, characteristically, the
type of opacity evident in Judge Henderson's opinion.

